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ABSTRACT 
This analysis shows the extent to which defence expenditures have affected the borrowing 
decisions of the government of Pakistan. Has the government resorted to increased 
borrowing in these markets to expand allocations to the military? Or, in contrast, have 
increased defence expenditures tended to restrict access to external credit? Weapons 
purchased with scarce foreign exchange lead to the availability of fewer resources for tbe 
import of investment goods essential for self-sustaining growth. On the one hand, external 
financing of defence expenditures would reduce the short-run sacrifices often associated 
with military expenditures. On the other han~, it appears that international lenders 
such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) may be increasingly inclined to restrict 
lending to countries with high levels of defence expenditures. 
RESUME 
Cette analyse montre a quel point /es depenses de defense influent sur /es decisions 
d'emprunt du gouvernement du Pakistan. Le gouvernement a-t-il recours a plus 
d'emprunts pour augmenter /es credits militaires ? Ou, au contraire, /'augmentation des 
depenses de defense tend-elle a reduire l'acces a /'.emprunt exterieur ? L'achat des armes 
avec le peu de devises etrangeres disponibles reduit /es ressources pour /'importation de 
biens d'investissement essentiels a une croissance autonome soutenue. D'un cOte, le 
financement exterieur des depenses de defense reduirait /es sacrifices a court terme souvent 
lies aux depenses militaires, mais de l'autre, ii semble que /es preteurs internationaux 
comme le Fond monetaire international (FM!) auraient de plus en plus tendance a 
imposer des restrictions sur /es prets aux pays qui ant des depenses de defense e/evees. 
Robert E. Looney is professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School, 
United States Department of the Navy. His major interests are government budgets and defence 
expenditures in the third world. He has published extensively on various aspects of ecomomic 
development. 








Weapons purchased with scarce foreign exchange lead to the availability of fewer 
resources for the import of intermediate and investment goods essential for self-
sustaining growth. A reduction in military imports does not necessarily imply an 
equivalent increase in investment. Some leakage in consumption or other imports 
could occur. However, there is little doubt that lower defence imports would help 
alleviate foreign exchange scarcity (Deger and Smith, 1985). 
In the same vein, Hewitt ( 1991) notes that in general, countries that spend 
more on the military in the long run must obtain financing by lowering private 
consumption expenditures, lowering private investment expenditures, lowering 
expenditUres on other government programs, and by obtaining additional resources 
from abroad. Here, the conventional wisdom is that whatever choice is made, the 
country is likely to experience lower current consumption and lower future rates 
of growth, with the exact mix ·depending on how the expenditures are financed. 
Clearly, on the one hand, external financing of defence expenditures would reduce 
the short-run sacrifices often associated with military expenditures. On the other 
hand, it appears (Dawn, 1996) that international lenders such as the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) may be increasingly inclined to restrict lending to countries 
with high levels of defence expenditures (Harris and Kusi, 1992). 
This analysis aims to determine the extent to which defence expenditures have 
affected the borrowing decisions of the government of Pakistan. Has the 
government resorted to increased borrowing in these markets to expand allocations 
to the military? Or, in contrast; have increased defence expenditures tended to 
restrict access to external credit? Have the patterns of borrowing and expenditures 
for the military differed significantly from those of the non-defence portions of 
the budget? Have these patterns changed over time? 
I. BACKGROUND 
Sen (1991, p. 182-183) has outlined the connections between the debt problem 
and security. Security is defined here in the broadest possible terms to include 
economic, political and military aspects: 
1. By reducing the import of essential commodities, the debt crisis can cause 
development failure. Lack of imported intermediate investment goods and 
technology reduces investment and productivity; this hampers economic 
growth. Low growth and develo!1rTient problems affect economic security. 
2. A reduction in economic security erodes the political legitimacy of 
governments. In extreme cases it may also erode the legitimacy of states. 
3. The ability of governments to spend on social, economic and infrastructural 
programs is hampered as increasing amounts of revenue are tied to public 
and publicly guaranteed debt servicing. For many Third World countries, 
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debt servicing and military expenditure take up 40-80% of all central 
government revenue, leaving very little for other essential needs. 
4. Conflicts, particularly intra-state conflicts, increase as a result of development 
failures; this has a spill-over effect on inter-state relationships. 
5. Arms imports, particularly in the Third World and in some European 
countries, have been a major contributory factor toward debt creation. While 
many of these debts were incurred by military and autocratic regimes, 
payments often have to be made by successive democratic governments. 
6. North-South relations are affected. The political influence of the major powers 
is eroded if they fail to curb the debt problem, reducing their influence when 
it comes to conflict resolution in the South. 
7. The breakdown of the world economic order, in part due to the debt crisis, 
can lead to major security problems such as those of the 1930s. 
8. The problems inherent in the debt crisis can be used in a positive mariner. 
Transfer of resources from the major powers to other countries can be linked 
to military expenditure reductions in recipient countries, success in arms 
control and the implementation Of confidence- and security-building 
measures. However, this requires greater policy coordination than is currently 
present in the international security system. 
9. The donor or creditor countries can do much more in transferring resources 
to debtors. In particular, reductions in military expenditure subsequent to 
the European peace process can potentially release huge amounts of resources 
that could be used productively to alleviate the economic burden of poorer 
countries. 
II. PREVIOUS STUDIES 
Despite these studies, few attempts have been made to assess quantitatively the 
role of military expenditures in contributing to Third World indebtedness. In an 
early study of Argentina, Shubik and Bracken (1983) found that Argentina was 
able to amass $33 billion in debt between 1978 and 1982, about $5 billion of 
which went to arms purchases. They conclude this came about because, compared 
to the traditional contracting terms for foreign and public sector loans, 
international capital flows in the 1970s and early 1980s increasingly came with 
few strings attached to their u_se. 
In another influential study, Brzoska (I 983) found that by the late 1970s the 
net transfer of debt could have been about 20-30% less if debt-financed weapons 
imports had not been a factor. 
Several cross-section studies have also examined the link between allocations 
to defence and external indebtedness. In an initial cross-section study (Looney, 
1987) discriminant analysis was used to divide countries into two groups on the 











(a) gross inflow of public loans to exports in 1982, (b) total public external debt 
in 1982, ( c) gross international reserves in 1982, ( d) public external debt as a 
percentage of GDP in 1982, (e) average annual growth in imports for 1970-82, (f) 
external debt as a percentage of GDP in 1982, and (g) public external debt as a 
percentage of GDP in 1970. 
The groupings, based on relative resource abundance, could be characterized 
as follows: Group I or resource-constrained countries were poorer, less 
economically dynamic nations. This group was heavily weighted with African 
and poorer Latin American countries. Pakistan, Burma and Sri Lanka were 
members of this group. Group II or relatively resource-unconstrained countries 
consisted of several major oil exporters and several of the more dynamic newly 
industrialized countries such as Mexico, Greece, India, Korea, Spain, Algeria, and 
Malaysia. 
In terms of variable means (Looney, 1987, p. 16): 
I. Group I (resource-constrained) countries resorted to a much higher (3.6 
times) inflow of external public loans in 1982 relative to their exports that 
year. 
2. On the other hand, the overall level of total public external debt in 1982 
averaged nearly 4.5 times as much for Group II (relatively resource-
unconstrained) countries than was the case for Group I countries. 
3. The level of international reserves was also much higher for Group II 
countries-nearly 10 times a~ much as the average for Group I countries. 
4. With regard to shares of debt in gross domestic product (GDP), however, 
Group I countries have much higher levels of attainment, averaging nearly 
twice as much as Group II countries in both 1970 and 1982. The debt service 
ratio to exports was correspondingly higher for Group I countries. 
5. The rate of growth of imports was nearly 10 times higher over the 1970-82 
period for Group II countries. 
Group II countries were therefore considerably larger, more affluent and less 
reliant on external debt as a percentage of GDP. They tended to spend relatively 
large amounts on military activities, but not necessarily significantly greater 
amounts of their overall budgets. 
These groupings provided useful contrasts to the role of military expenditures 
in external debt. For the resource-constrained countries (Group I) GDP and 
international reserves accounted for about 50% of the observed fluctuations in 
total public external debt with internatiopal reserves having a positive sign. Adding 
military expenditure increased the overall correlation coefficient to over 83%, 
with military expenditures being highly significant. Imports were also significant 
when added to the regression equation. As noted, these countries tended to be 
characterized by relatively low rates of growth in imports as compared to the 
unconstrained countries. They also had much higher levels of public external 
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debt. Clearly, external borrowing may be the only way these countries were able 
to maintain or increase their military expenditures. 
The results for the unconstrained countries were in marked contrast to those 
found present in the constrained group of nations. For these countries, military 
expenditures did not appear to have contributed to the overall accumulation of 
public external debt. In fact, when regressed as an independent variable along 
with merchandise imports, military expenditures assu·med a negative sign. 
In sum, at least since the early 1980s, the use of public external indebtedness to 
finance military expenditures has not appeared to be universal among developing 
countries. In fact, it is possible that a large group of relatively debt-free (where 
debt is measured as a percentage of GDP) resource-unconstrained countries have 
kept military expenditures within the limits imposed by self-financing, rather 
than risk jeopardizing their overall credit-worthiness. 
On the other hand, the bulk of debt accumulated by the relatively resource-
constrained developing countries may have stemmed from military expenditures 
and presumably arms imports. Apparently, the perceived need to expand defence 
expenditures by this group in the fact of foreign exchange shortages has resulted 
in relatively high levels of external indebtedness. 
In another study (Looney, 1989), using two stage least squares regression 
equations confirmed the findings noted above: military expenditures contributed 
to the overall debt position of the constrained countries, but not the unconstrained 
countries. It also appears that: 
1. Both the constrained and unconstrained countries were, ceteris paribus, able 
to reduce their overall level of arms import through indigenous arms 
production, but perhaps because of their relative access to foreign exchange, 
the unconstrained countries were able to expand domestic production to a 
greater extent, thus replacing a larger volume of imports. 
2. Foreign exchange shortage has likely forced the constrained countries to 
substitute personnel for imported equipment. 
3. The unconstrained countries appear more able to reach an optimal mix 
between armed forces and total military expenditures. 
In general, it appears that developing countries as a group have not placed 
excessive reliance on external financing to support the import of arms (Looney, 
1989). Countries experiencing relative resource constraint (foreign exchange and 
domestic savings) have, however, used foreign borrowing to finance increased 
arms imports. This has also been the situation for financing total defence 
expenditures (Looney, 1987). 
In these studies, Pakistan consistently falls into the constrained category (see 
table 1) with a high degree of probability. On th~ basis, the country might be 
expected to have to borrow extensively in external markets to fund its relatively 











Focussing more on military aid, Deger and Sen (1991) have examined the 
relationships between that source of funding and defence expenditures on the 
one hand and economic development and economic assistance on the other. 
Their findings suggest that 
the possibility of crowding out between economic and military aid must be taken 
seriously. They also find evidence of crowding in-<>f donors viewing the two types 
of aid as complements rather than substitutes. (Deger and Sen, 1991) 
The issue hinges on fungibility and the leakages that can occur throughout the 
economic system of aid recipients as foreign assistance filters through. Even tied 
economic aid raises the possibility that released resources will be used to finance 
greater military spending and arms imports. This implies, of course, a need to re-
examine the specificity of development and security assistance programs, the 
selection of tied or untied aid, the use of general balance of payments or 
government expenditure support programs, and the need for conditional 
provisions that cover military variables. The links between project and policy 
reform lending also take on greater importance in the light of fungibility and 
leakages between civilian and military sectors. 
As Khilji and Zampelli (1991) note, traditionally, the public finance literature 
regarding the impact of grants-in-aid on recipient expenditures has assumed that 
the recipient's budget constraint is altered according to the nominal or legal 
provisions of grant programs. In recent years, analysts such as McGuire ( 1982, 
1987) have challenged this assumption by assuming that (a) the legal provisions 
of grant programs are unlikely to be fully known, given their extreme complexity, 
and (b) even iflegal provisions were fully known, grant recipients can successfully 
circumvent such restrictions in a number of ways. 
Based on these assumptions, McGuire formulated a model of aid assuming 
that a certain portion of earmarked grant funds can be converted into purely 
fungible, revenue-augmenting resources while the remaining portion effectively 
reduces the price of the aided good. In examining the case of Israel, McGuire 
found that U.S. military assistance was used for military purposes whereas 
economic assistance was used as another source of fungible revenue. 
In their examination of Pakistan, Khilji and Zampelli (1991, p. 1102-1103) 
found the following: 
1. U.S. unconditional assistance, whether for defence or non-defence purposes, 
is fully transformed into purely fungible resources. 
2. Pakistan's marginal propensity to spend internal and external fungible 
resources on public sector go()ds and services is approximately 0.26, implying 
that one additional rupee in fungible resources will raise public spending by 
0.26 rupees(Rs) with 0.08 Rs going to defence and 0.18 Rs to non-defence. 
The remaining 0.74 Rs goes into private sector consumption. 
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Table 1. Classification of developing countries on the basis of relative 



































































































































3. There appears to be little evidence of a "flypaper" effect of fungible U.S. aid. 
One additional rupee is treated the same regardless of its source. This suggests 
that the assistance targeted at government development projects seems to 
find its way into other uses that may not be consistent with development 












The budgetary patterns of a number of Third World countries may also 
contribute to the use of foreign exchange for military expenditures or arms imports 
(Deger and Sen, 1991, p. 182-183): 
1. A percentage of total foreign excha·nge earnings from major exports is 
sometimes allocated to arms imports. Chile has done this with copper export 
earnings, and the Gulf states and Libya, with oil revenues. This insulates 
arms imports from any overall adjustments in the balance of payments. 
2. During privatization programs, proceeds from the sale of state assets are 
partly earmarked for the military. This is particularly likely to occur in the 
defence industries, where the proceeds can be used to increase the salaries of 
military personnel, as was the case in Pakistan. 
3. Pensions for military personnel are often substantially higher than those of 
other government employees. Early retirement at full pension or staff 
reorganizations with "golden handshakes" are often used to compensate 
defence personnel, particularly during periods of political instability. Because 
military pension funds are not subject to audit, their investment activities are 
often unknown. 
4. Defence expenditures are resilient. When aggregate expenditure falls, the 
military sector's share rises. Closer investigation at the country level is needed 
to find out how and why this reliance has occurred, particularly during 
periods of externally imposed austerity. 
5. Some empirical evidence indicates that the impact of changes in military 
expenditure-and the nature of crowding out-is asymmetric. When defence 
spending rises, investment falls; then when defence spending falls, 
consumption increases. Thus, reductions in military expenditure may not be 
growth-inducing unless some mechanism is in place to ensure that resources 
released from the defence sector are applied to investment. 
6. For most arms-importing countries, it is difficult to determine how the 
trade is being financed-through military aid, debt creation, compensatory 
trade arrangements such as offsets, or through cash transactions. Military 
debt-related statistics are useful, but they are unavailable from the debtor's 
side. 
With these warnings in mind, the following sections attempt to determine 
whether the Pakistani government has used foreign borrowing to maintain and 
expand the country's allocations to the military. 
An important issue to be resolved here is the timing of this borrowing: has 
defence spending led to subsequent bohowing, or has past borrowing relaxed the 
general budgetary constraint sufficiently to enable a subsequent expansion in 
funds allocated to the military? This is an important point because the timing of 
the expenditure and borrowing patterns will likely affect the manner in which 
defence expenditures affect the economy as a whole. 
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Table 2. Expansion and composition of public sector borrowing, 1953-1991 
Total Borrowing Composition 
Amount Growth Domestic Foreign 
(billion 1985 rupees) (%) (%) (%) 
1953 3358.4 80.11 19.89 
~954 2038.8 -39.29 92.31 7.69 
1955 3445.8 69.01 91.53 8.47 
1956 2016.4 -41.48 98.78 1.22 
1957 6865.3 240.48 98.53 1.47 
1958 6310.7 -8.08 99.29 0.71 
1959 8210.1 30.10 57.39 42.61 
1960 8316.9 1.30 86.28 13.72 
1961 4380.0 -47.34 78.54 21.46 
1962 5708.6 30.33 64.85 35.15 
1963 7842.1 37.37 51.93 48.08 
1964 7956.8 1.46 37.24 62.76 
1965 12694.4 -76.00 
1966 16798.1 -100.96 57.33 42.67 
1967 19383.1 52.69 12.98 87.01 
1968 13872.0 -28.43 15.44 84.56 
1969 13384.3 -3.52 31.23 68.77 
1970 18364.9 37.21 57.10 42.90 
1971 11669.5 -36.46 36.78 63.22 
1972 11129.0 -4.63 68.73 31.27 
1973 15243.9 36.97 24.55 75.45 
1974 13767.7 -9.68 38.77 61.23 
1975 27406.5 99.06 34.31 65.69 
1976 23991.8 -12.46 44.24 55.76 
1977 19281.2 -19.63 50.23 49.77 
1978 21012.0 8.97 56.94 43.06 
1979 29150.7 38.73 63.94 36.05 
1980 13033.7 -55.29 40.13 59.87 
1981 18183.4 39.51 54.12 45.88 
1982 11863.7 -34.76 58.99 41.01 
1983 21399.1 80.37 77.67 22.33 
~984 18873.6 -11.80 81.63 18.37 
1985 15048.0 -20.27 87.16 12.84 
1986 39742.5 164.11 87.82 12.18 
1987 28442.6 -28.44 81.32 18.67 
1988 24077.8 -15.34 58.18 41.82 
1989 42775.0 77.65 65.38 34.62 
1990 40981.0 -4.19 69.24 30.76 
1991 32390.0 -20.96 59.63 40.37 
Source: IMF, various issues. 
III. PATTERNS OF BORROWING 
The Pakistani government's borrowing has been erratic during the period covered 
(table 2). This pattern has characterized both borrt:>wing from the domestic market 










have also changed drastically from year to year. In spite of these erratic movements, 
several patterns stand out: 
1. Foreign borrowing does not appear to have been a major source of financing 
until 1959. In that year, it accounted for over 42% of domestic government 
borrowing. In the following year, however, it fell to 13.7%. 
2. Foreign borrowing increased through most of the 1960s. In 1967, it reached 
a high of 87% of total borrowing. · 
3. Throughout much of the 1970s and into the mid-1980s, there was a gradual 
contraction in the relative importance of foreign borrowing. 
4. After reaching a low of 12.2% of total borrowing in 1986, foreign borrowing 
has risen to around 40% in recent years. 
5. In terms of absolute amounts, domestic borrowing has declined each year 
since 1987. 
IV. CAUSATION 
Several questions must be answered here: (1) To what extent have expanded rates 
of expenditure been financed with increased public sector borrowing in external 
markets? Do accelerations in expenditures lead to increased borrowing? After 
how long? (2) Does expanded borrowing subsequently constrain the government's 
ability to sustain or increase expenditures? and (3) If these constraints exist, are 
they more stringent for loans for defence or non-defence activities? 
Ultimately, any statistical test for causation will be based on a number of 
arbitrary assumptions. Still, using a number of alternative specifications for the 
key variables, it is possible to make some credible inferences concerning the 
timing of savings and GDP or of savings and private investment. 
The original and most widely used causality test was developed by Granger 
(1969, 1988). According to this test, which uses expenditures and borrowing, 
expenditures affect the growth in borrowing if this series can be predicted more 
accurately by past values of expenditures than by past rates of growth in borrowing. 
To be certain that causality runs from expenditures to borrowing, past growth 
rates in expenditures must also be more accurate than past values of borrowing 
in predicting increases in expenditures. 
The results of Granger causality tests depend critically on the choice of lag 
length. If the chosen lag length is less than the true lag length, the omission of 
relevant lags can cause bias. If the chosen lag length is greater than the true lag 
length, the inclusion of irrelevant lags causes estimates to be inaccurate. While it 
is possible to choose lag lengths based on preliminary partial autocorrelation 
methods, there is no a priori reason to assume lag lengths are equal for all types of 
deficits. 
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To overcome the difficulties noted above, Hsaio (1981) developed a systematic 
method for assigning lags. This method combines Granger causality and Akaike's 
final prediction error (FPE), the (asymptotic) mean square prediction error, to 
determine the optimum lag for each variable. In a paper examining the problems 
encountered in choosing lag lengths, Thornton and Batten (1985) found Hsiao's 
method to be superior to both arbitrary lag length selection and several other 
systematic procedures for determining lag length. · 
Depending on the value of the FPEs, four cases are possible: (a) Expenditures 
cause borrowing when the FPE for borrowing activity decreases when expenditures 
are included in the borrowing equation. In addition, when borrowing is added to 
the expenditure equation, the FPE should not decrease; (b) Borrowing causes 
Expenditures when the FPE for expenditures increases or stays the same when 
expenditures are added to the regression equation for borrowing, and is reduced 
when borrowing is added to the regression equation for expenditures; ( c) Feedback 
occurs when the FPE decreases when expenditures are added to the borrowing 
equation, and the FPE decreases when borrowing is added to the expenditure 
equation; and (d) No relationship exists when the FPE does not decrease both 
when expenditures are added to the borrowing equation and when borrowing is 
added to the expenditures equation. 
V. OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES 
The data used to conduct the causation tests was derived from figures of 
International Monetary Fund (IMF, 1996) and the Stockholm International Peace 
Research Institute (SIPRI, 1996). All variables were deflated by the GDP deflator 
and are in constant 1985 prices. To ensure that the series were stationary (Pesaran, 
1997), the variables were transformed into their annual growth rates. 
As noted in table 2, the pattern of public borrowing in external markets can 
change significantly from year to year, masking some of the more stable, longer-
run linkages between government programs and their ongoing need for funding. 
These longer-run borrowing needs can often be offset by shorter-run concern 
with macroeconomic imbalances such as stabilization, inflation, and balance of 
payment problems. For the purposes of the analysis here, longer-run funding 
commitments and short-run stabilization actions should be isolated with analysis 
that is focussed on the longer-run links between expenditures and borrowing. 
Unfortunately, it is impossible to make such a priori functional distinctions in 
the data. Instead, we considered two alternative proxies for the longer-run 
borrowing commitments and for the short-run stabilization element. The basic 
assumption underlying these proxies is that a large component of public borrowing 
reflects an ongoing process that evolves slowly ans cannot change rapidly. The 
first of the two approaches takes the trend level of real public sector borrowing as 





























Table 3. Pakistan: Government expenditures/anticipated 
foreign borrowing causality patterns 
Measure of expenditures Direction of Optimal lag 
causation (impact) (years) strength 
1958-1991 
Total Expenditures Feedback(+,-) (2,4) weak, moderate 
Total Expenditures % GDP Feedback(+,-) (2,3) moderate 
Defence Expenditures ExpendBorrow (-) (1) weak 
Defence Expenditures % GDP ExpendBorrow (-) (1) weak 
Non-Defence Expenditures Feedback(+,-) (2) moderate, weak 
Non-Defence Expenditures % GDP ExpendBorrow (+) (2) strong 
1958-1973 
Total Expenditures ExpendBorrow (+) (2) 'moderate 
Total Expenditures % GDP ExpendBorrow (+) (2) moderate 
Defence Expenditures No Relationship 
Defence Expenditures % GDP No Relationship 
Non-Defence Expenditures ExpendBorrow (+) (3) strong 
Non-Defence Expenditures % GDP ExpendBorrow (+) (2) strong 
1973-1991 
Total Expenditures ExpendBorrow (+) (1) moderate 
Total Expenditures % GDP ExpendBorrow (+) (2) moderate 
Defence Expenditures Feedback (-,-) (1,2) moderate 
Defence Expenditures % GDP Feedback (-.-) (1,2) moderate 
Non-Defence Expenditures ExpendBorrow (+) (1) moderate 
Non-Defence Expenditures % GDP ExpendBorrow (+) (2) strong 
Note: Summary of results obtained from Granger Causality Tests using a Hsaio Procedure to 
determine the optimal lag. The ·dominant pattern is defined as that with the lowest final 
prediction error. All variables are defined as the annual rate of growth and are in stationary 
form as indicated by the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test. In the case of feedback the first 
term refers to the impact of the measure of expenditures on borrowing, while the second refers 
to the impact of borrowing on expenditures. Defence expenditures are from the Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI, 1996), while economic data are from the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF, 1996). 
expansion in public revenues. Deviations from this trend of real public sector 
borrowing are assumed to correspond to the stabilization component of borrowing. 
A second approach is to make a distinction between types of borrowing on the 
basis of whether borrowing is expected or not. Again it is assumed that expected 
or anticipated borrowing is closer to the long-run borrowing needs of the 
government. This term is prox.ied by regressing real public sector borrowing on 
its value for the previous year. In this scheme, unexpected borrowing (the difference 
between actual and expected borrowing) would represent the component of 
borrowing affected by shorter-rurt stabilization considerations. 
In the context of the causation tests, both measures gave generally the same 
picture of the interdependence of expenditures and borrowing. However, because 
the variables used in the causality tests were defined in terms of growth rates, the 
anticipated figures were felt to be conceptually superior to the trend values. 
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Relationships were considered valid if they were statistically significant at the 
95% level of confidence. That is, if 95% of the time we could conclude that the 
relationships had not occurred by pure chance, they were statistically significant. 
As noted above, there is no theoretical reason to believe that expenditure 
aggregates and borrowing have a set lag relationship-that is, that they affect one 
another over a fixed time period. To find the optimal adjustment period of 
impact, lag structures of up to four years were estimated. The lag structure with 
the highest level of statistical significance was the one chosen, which best depicts 
the relationship under consideration (the optimal lag reported in table 3). To 
assess the robustness of our findings, tests were conducted using several 
transformations of the key variables: the growth in the share of expenditures in 
GDP (total, defence and non-defence) as well as the actual growth rates of these 
categories. 
VI. RESULTS 
The causality tests produced several interesting patterns (table 3) in the 
interrelationship between public sector expenditures and anticipated foreign 
borrowing for the period as a whole: 
1. Increases in total expenditures provided a weak stimulus to increased external 
borrowing. This impact occurred with foreign borrowing affected by increased 
expenditures in the two previous years. There is also a stronger feedback 
effect, whereby increased external borrowing tends to place a constraint on 
future expenditures. This effect occurs over a longer time period with increases 
in foreign borrowing in the four previous years affecting the current year's 
increase in total real government expenditures. 
2. Increases in the share of resources controlled by the government through 
expenditures (as a percentage of GDP) has a stronger impact on external 
borrowing. Here, it seems when the government wishes to increase the overall 
percentage of national resources spent by the public authorities, it must fund 
them through external sources. In turn, this borrowing acts as a weak 
constraint on further increases in the share of government expenditures in 
GDP. 
3. In sharp contrast, increas~s in the growth rate of defence expenditures tend 
to reduce future borrowing in external markets. This effect is weak, but it 
holds for both defence and the defence burden. The lag between defence and 
external borrowing is only one year, with increased defence expenditures in 
the current year somewhat reducing the level of foreign funding contracted 
for the next year. 
4. Non-defence expenditures follow a pattern similar to that of total expenditures. 
Increases in non-defence expenditures produce a fairly rapid lag (one year) 
and a strong expansion in external borrowings. In turn, this borrowing feeds 











5. Increases in the share of non-defence expenditures provide a strong impetus 
to expanded external borrowing. The average lag is around two years, with 
the government's efforts to increase the share of national resources allocated 
to this expenditure category resulting in a discernible increase in external 
borrowing requirements. 
Several interesting changes occurred over time in the manner in which public 
expenditures interacted with foreign borrowing. For the first period (1958-1973 ): 
1. Most of the relationships were relatively straightforward, with no apparent 
feedback effects present. 
2. Both increases in the growth in total expenditures and in non-defence 
expenditures translated into strong borrowings in exterfial markets. This 
occurred for both the increase in expenditures and the growth in their share 
of GDP. The lags between changes in expenditures and changes in external 
borrowings were fairly short-two years in most cases. 
3. Expanded defence expenditures or increases in the defence burden were not 
facilitated by foreign funding. For both measures of military expenditures, 
no statistically significant relationship occurred with foreign borrowing. 
Finally, for the more recent time period (1973-1991): 
1. Increased rate of growth in total expenditures translated into a fairly rapid 
lag (one-year) and a strong increase in foreign borrowing. The same was true 
for increases in the share of national resources spent by the government, 
although here the lag was two years. 
2. Defence expenditures provided an interesting contrast. Both increases in 
defence expenditures and in the defence burden interacted with external 
borrowing in a complex manner: increases in defence expenditures tended to 
dampen subsequent external borrowing in the next year. In turn, increased 
external borrowing over two years tended to reduce the expansion in defence 
expenditures and the defence burden. 
3. Non-defence expenditures again followed a pattern similar to that of total 
expenditures, with a relatively strong expansion in external borrowing in the 
year follow_ing increased growth rates in non-defence expenditures or in the 
share of national resources allocated to non-defence activities. 
CONCLUSION 
Returning to the questions initially posed: Has the Pakistani government resorted 
to increased borrowing in external markets to expand allocations to the military? 
Or, in contrast, have increased defence expenditures tended to restrict access to 
external credit? Have the patterns of borrowing and expenditures for the military 
differed significantly from those of the non-defence portions of the budget? Have 
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these patterns changed over time? Based on the findings reported above, several 
conclusions can be made: increased defence expenditures have actually reduced 
future borrowing; this pattern is the opposite of that associated with non-defence 
expenditures; and the defence expenditure and reduced external borrowing pattern 
have strengthened over time. 
The results are interesting from two perspectives. First, the results highlight 
several apparent contradictions. On the one hand, cross-section analysis suggests 
that Pakistan, as a relatively resource-constrained country, might be expected to 
resort to extensive external borrowing to support its level of defence expenditures. 
On the other hand, time-series analysis questions whether external borrowing 
has been a major factor in funding the country's expanded defence expenditures. 
If anything, this analysis suggests that concern over Pakistan's defence expenditures 
has caused foreign lenders to cut back on lending to that country. 
These two sets of findings can be reconciled in several ways: 
1. The cross-section analysis is largely for the 1970s and early 1980s, and the 
patterns found there may not have he.Id up in subsequent years. 
2. Pakistan may not be a typical resource-constrained country. The country has 
received considerable amounts of economic aid, and, as recent studies suggest, 
this aid may be quite fungible into the military acquisition process. 
3. Given the nature of the data, time-series analysis must focus on longer-run 
trends. Much of the external borrowing for defence could be short-term and 
therefore not be detected by the causation tests. 
Second, and perhaps most important, the results suggest that international 
lenders may have had de facto a policy in pla~e for some time to restrict lending to 
countries that are perceived to allocate excessive amounts to the military. 
Specifically, recent public statements by the IMF and other international lending 
agencfes to the effect that countries that increase defence expenditures will find 
their borrowing curtailed may, in fact, not be articulating a new policy, but instead 
simply publicly acknowledging an existing practice. 
REFERENCES 
Brzoska, M., "The Military Related External Debt of Third World Countries," Journal of 
Peace Research, 20, no. 3, 1983, p. 271-77. 
Dawn, "IMF Calls for Slashing Military Expenditure," Dawn, September 19, 1996. 
Deger, S. and S. Sen, "Military Expenditure, Aid, and Economic Development," Proceedings of 
the World Bank, Annual Conference on Development Economics, 1991, p. 159-190 . 
• 
Deger, S. and R. Smith, "Military Expenditure and Development: The Economic Linkages," 











Granger, C.W.J., "Investigating Causal Relations by Econometric Models and Cross-
Spectral Methods," Econometrica, 37, 1969, p. 424-438. 
__ , "Some Recent Developments in a Concept of Causality," Journal of Econometrics, 
vol. 39, 1988, p. 199-211. · 
Harris, G.T. and N. Kusi, "The Impact of the IMF on Government Expenditures: A 
Study of African LDCs," Journal of International Development, 4, no. l, 1992, p. 73-86. 
Hewitt, D., "What Determines Military Expenditure," Finance and Development, 28, no. 
4, 1991, p. 22-25. 
Hsiao, C., "Autoregressive Modeling and Money-Income Causality Detection," Journal 
of Monetary Economics, 7, 1981, p. 85-106. 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), International Financial Statistics Yearbook, 
Washington, DC, IMF, 1996. 
Khilji, N. and E. Zampelli, "The Fungibility of US Assistance to Developing Countries 
and the Impact on Recipient Expenditures: A Case Study of Pakistan," World 
Development, 19, no. 8, 1991, p. 1095-96. 
Looney, R.E., "The Impact of Military Expenditures on Third World Debt," Canadian 
Journal of Development Studies, VII, no. l, 1987, p. 7-26. 
__ , "The Influence of Arms Imports on Third World Debt," Journal of Developing 
Areas, 23, no. 2, 1989, p. 221-232. 
Looney, RE. and Peter C. Frederiksen, "Defence Expenditures, External Public Debt, and 
Growth in Developing Countries," Journal of Peace Research, 23, no. 4, 1986, p. 338. 
McGuire, M.C., "Foreign Assistance, Investment, and Defence: A Methodological Study 
with an Application to Israel, 1960-79," Economic Development and Cultural Change, 
vol. 35, no. 4, 1987, p. 847-874. 
_,"U.S. Assistance and Israeli Allocation," The Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 26, 
no. 2, 1982, p. 199-236. 
Pesaran, M.H. and B. Pesaran, Microfit 4.0: Interactive Econometric Analysis, Cambridge, 
Camfit Data Ltd., 1997. 
Sen, S., "Debt, Financial Flows and International Security," in SIPRI, ed., SIPRI Yearbook, 
1991, p. 182-83, New York, Oxford University Press, 1991. 
Shubik, M. and Paul Bracken, "Strategic Purpose and International Economy," Orbis, 
Fall 1983, p. 567-91. 
SIPRI, SIPRI Yearbook, New York, Oxford University Press, 1996. 
Thornton, D.L. and D.S. Batten, "Lag-Length Selection and Tests of Granger Causality Between 
Money and Income," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 1985, p. 164-178. 
